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that	 this	account	cannot	be	extended	 to	 illusions.	By	 reconstructing	













dent	 reality	 are	 presented	 in	 experience,	 and	 thereby	 constitutively	
shape	 the	 contours	of	 consciousness	 (Martin	 1997,	 2004,	 Fish	 2009,	
Kalderon	2015).
Prescinding	 from	any	epistemic	 connotations,	 call	 the	 relation	at	
the	heart	of	the	naïve	realist	account	conscious acquaintance	(Campbell	
2002,	Fish	2009,	Brewer	2011,	Soteriou	2013).	And	call	those	entities	




































for	 ordinary	 veridical	 cases	 are	 needed:	 familiar	mind-independent	
objects	 and	 their	 basic	 visible	 properties.3	 In	 particular,	 no	 appeal	































Walters	 2018),	 but	 its	 second	 premise		 the	 so-called	 Phenomenal	

























me,	 though	 it	 does	 look	 square.	…	This	 square’s	 shape	
furnishes	 the	 phenomenal	 character	 of	 the	 illusory	 per-
ception	…	 in	 the	 respect	of	being	as	of	a	 square.	What,	
however,	about	the	apparent	yellowness?	It,	clearly,	must	













Simplicity:	 The	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments	of	ordinary	veridical	experience	are	just	ordinary	




understood	 in	 Simplicity),	 neither	 in	 relational	 nature,	
nor	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments	to	which	they	are	relations.







with	 the	car	and	 its	 redness,	and	 that	 these	presented	elements	are	
constitutive	of	 character;	and	 that	 in	Window	Case,	S	 is	acquainted	
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In	 rejecting	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism,	Smith	 and	Fish	 thus	
assume	that	if	two	experiences	have	different	phenomenal	properties,	
they	must	 have	 different	 character-constituting	 presented	 elements.	









alike	 in	 phenomenal	 character,	 then	 they	 are	 alike	 in	
character-constituting	presented	elements.
The	Difference	 Principle	will	 be	 our	 focus	 in	what	 follows.	 In	 addi-
tion	to	Smith	and	Fish,	many	other	critics	of	naïve	realism	endorse	the	
principle.	Foster	assumes	it	when	he	argues	that	the	mere	existence	





argument	 against	 naïve	 realism	 “based	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 [in	 special	
experimental	contexts]	…	there	can	be	more	 than	one	phenomenal	
character	 of	 experience	 of	 the	 same	 instantiated	 properties,	 even	 if	
nothing	about	the	environment	or	the	non-mental	relations	between	
the	subject	and	the	environment	differs”	 (2010:	49−50)	 lapses	 if	 the	
4.	 Martin	 cites	 Price	 1932.	 Theorists	 (e.g.	 Block	 2010)	 sometimes	 talk	 about	








completely	 veridical	 perception,	 where	 the	 constituent	
object	itself	does	all	the	work.	(2010:	388–389)






















Fish	 seizes	 the	 second	horn	 of	 the	 dilemma,	 developing	 a	more	





















nor	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-
ments	to	which	they	are	relations.





























differing	 neural	 response	 dispositions	 also	 assumes	 that	 naïve	 real-









































(6)	 Simplicity:	 The	 character-constituting	 presented	
elements	 of	 ordinary	 veridical	 experience	 are	 just	






partly	determining	what	 is	 there to	 be	 selected.7 For	 instance,	 in	Car	
Case,	 Fish	 denies	 that	 S	 is	 acquainted	with	 the	 fact	 of	 the	 car’s	 be-
ing	 red.	 Instead,	 S is	 acquainted	 with	 the	 car’s	 exhibiting	 a	 certain	
(presumably	orange	or	orange-looking)	shade,	where	 this	 shade	 is	a	
relational	property	determined	partly	by	the	car’s	color	but	partly	by	
relevant	illumination	conditions	(158).8	Since	the	car	has	this	property	
only	 relative	 to	 the	 current	 perceptual	 conditions,	 those	 conditions	
play	a	determinative availability role.
Finally,	Genone	also	endorses	a	determinative	role	for	perceptual	
conditions.	 For	Genone,	 appearances,	whilst	 “entirely	mind-indepen-
dent”	(2014:	357)	properties,	are	distinct	from	the	basic	visible	proper-
ties	of	objects	such	as	their	sizes,	shapes,	and	colors.	Rather,	appear-








Despite	 their	 differences,	 Kalderon,	 Fish,	 and	 Genone	 all	 under-













conditions.	Thus,	plausibly,	 in	Window	Case,	S sees	 the	 rectangular	
window	as	square	because she is looking at it from a certain point of view, 
and in	Car	Case,	S sees	the	red	car	as	orange	because it is illuminated by 
streetlights. More	generally,	differences	in	character	between	the	kinds	
of	 veridical	 and	 illusory	 pairs	 targeted	 by	 the	Difference	Argument	
arise	because	of	differences	in	perspective	and	perceptual	conditions.
This	Appeal to Perspective doesn’t	tell	us	how	facts	about	perspective	
and	conditions	explain	phenomenal	differences.	Yet	almost	without	
exception,	they	are	taken	to	play	an	availability role:	They	affect	which 











































to	 different	 perspectival	 shapes	 or	 relational	 appearances,	 let	 alone	
represented	shapes	or	shaped	sense-data.
In	this	way,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	reject	the	Differ-
ence	Principle,	and	hence	 the	Difference	Argument.	Against	 it,	 they	
insist	 that	 there	 need	 not	 be	 just	 one	way	 of	 seeing	 a	 given	 scene.	






Difference	 Principle.10	 The	 price	 is	 Austerity.	 For	 differences	 in	 per-
spective	do	not	change	which	ordinary	objects	and	qualities	are	avail-
able	 across	 veridical	 and	 illusory	 pairs.	 Thus,	 additional	 presented	
elements	must	be	introduced:	for	Kalderon,	looks of	objects	or	colors,	
conceived	of	 as	distinct	 from	basic	 visible	qualities	or	 amalgams	of	
such;11	for	Fish,	special	relational	shades	and	perspectival	shapes;	and	
for	 Genone,	 relational,	 context-specific	 appearances.	 The	 common	
consequence	is	the	rejection	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.
In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	 offer	 a	 different	 response	 to	 the	 Differ-
ence	Argument	which	is	fully	consistent	with	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	
Realism.




sume	 (e.g.	 Block	 2010:	 29),	 built	 into	 the	 very	 idea	 that	mind-inde-
pendent	entities	are	character-constituting	constituents	of	experience.	
We	now	explain	how	denying	the	Difference	Principle	is	perfectly	co-
herent	 for	 the	naïve	 realist.	We	first	present	our	proposal,	and	 then	
develop	it	by	responding	to	a	series	of	challenges.
In	voicing	skepticism	about	Diaphaneity,	Martin	asks	rhetorically:	
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5.2 Isn’t our view simply a three-place or third-relatum account such as of-
fered by Campbell and Brewer?
The	answer	depends	on	how	exactly	such	views	should	be	understood.	
Consider	 first	 Campbell	 (2009,	 also	 Campbell	 and	 Cassam	 2014).	
Campbell	notes	that	you	can	have	different	experiences	of	a	complex	
shape	 (2009:	 655),	 for	 example	 by	 viewing	 it	 from	different	 angles.	
He	thus	rejects	 the	view	that	 “the	 full	characterization	of	your	expe-
rience	of	shape	is	given	by	saying	that	you	bear	the	generic	relation	
of	consciousness	 to	a	particular	 three-dimensional	shape”	(ibid.).	 In-
stead,	and	like	us,	Campbell	proposes	that	shapes	can	be	experienced	
in	different	ways.	Distinctively,	however,	Campbell	unpacks	this	idea	





On	 one	 interpretation,	Campbell’s	 picture	 is	 highly	 congenial	 to	
Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	On	this	interpretation,	the	third-rela-
tum	 serves	 to	deny	 that	 there	 is	 a	 function	 (unique	mapping)	 from	
subjects	 and	 presented	 elements	 to	 phenomenal	 characters.	 This	 is	
equivalent	 to	 denying	 the	 Difference	 Principle.	 Campbell	 goes	 be-




our	approach.	We	see	no	 reason	 to	endorse	 (nor	attribute	 to	Camp-









ways,	 due	 to	 variation	 in	perspectival	 factors.	We	now	develop	 this	
core	claim	via	a	series	of	challenges.










specifically to account for illusions.	Veridical	perceptions	equally	involve	
ways	of	perceiving.	When	S	veridically	perceives	the	red	car,	the	car	










sensitivity	 and	macular	 pigmentation),	 “any	 [color]	 chip	 is	 likely	 to	





identical	 presented	 elements,	 allowing	 for	 inter-individual	 phenom-
enological	variation	despite	sameness	in	presented	elements.
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existing	three-place	naïve	realist	views	on a certain minimal interpreta-
tion of them.	Indeed,	minimally	interpreted,	we	do	not	consider	there	
to	 be	 any	 substantive	 difference	 between	 treating	 perception	 as	 a	
single	three-place	relation	holding	between	subjects,	standpoints,	and	
presented	elements,	or	as	a	multiply	determinable	two-place	relation	
holding	 between	 subjects	 and	 presented	 elements.	 On	 both	 treat-
ments,	 there	 is	 no	 function	 from	 presented	 elements	 to	 conscious	
perceptual	 characters.	And	on	neither	 view	do	 standpoints	 or	ways	
number	amongst	the	presented	elements	of	perception.	Nonetheless,	
given	 the	evident	confusion	and	obscurity	surrounding	 the	 interpre-
tation	of	 three-place	views,	we	avoid	 framing	our	own	view	in	such	
terms.
5.3 Isn’t our view just a form of adverbialism?
The	adverbialist	holds	that	“having	a	visual	experience	is	a	matter	of	
sensing	in	a	certain	manner”	(Tye	1984:	195–196).	This	provides	them	
with	a	simple	account	of	 illusions.	Of	Car	Case,	 for	 instance,	the	ad-
verbialist	will	hold	that	even	though	there	is	nothing	orange	perceptu-
ally	presented	to	S, S	“senses	orangely”		that	is,	senses	in	an	orange	


























the	perceptual	 relation	 in	addition	 to	subject	and	presented	objects.	
Relative	 to	 this	 third-relatum,	 Brewer	 holds	 that	 the	 car	 is	 visually	
similar	to	a	paradigm	orange	object.	This	grounds	the	car’s	possession	
of	an	orange	look.	This	look	is	not	a	basic	visible	quality,	but	rather	a	
special	—	albeit	 perfectly	 objective	—	feature	 that	 the	 car	 has	 in	 rela-








on	which	 looks	are	not	 themselves	presented	elements.14	Rather,	 as	
on	our	view,	presented	elements	are	presented	in	particular	ways	de-
pending	on	 the	 circumstances	of	 perception.	Relative	 to	 some	 such	
set	 of	 circumstances,	 a	 given	 element	has	 the	 objective	 property	 of	




































We	 also	 deny	Beck’s	 claim	 that	ways	 of	 presentation	 are	 completely	 deter-














of	being acquainted with character-constituting presented elements.	There	is	
no	such	thing	as	merely	perceiving	under	sodium	streetlights	(French	
2014:	411).16

































presentation	mischaracterize	 their	 objects;	 they	 are	 veridical	 if	 and	












orangeness isn’t	 instantiated	 in	 the	environment	 that	S	perceives.	Yet	
the	car	looks	orange to	S.	So:




ways	 of	 presentation.	 It	 enters	 via	 the	 relation	 of	 appearing	 orange	
according	 to	 the	 Theory	 of	 Appearing.	 And	 it	 enters	 into	 the	man-
ner	 of	 presentation	on	 Johnston’s	 view.	But	 how	does	 our	 view	get	
These	ways	are	not	detachable	from	character-constituting	presented	















ston	 (2011,	 2014),	which	he	 explicitly	 aligns	with	 the	Theory	 of	Ap-
pearing	(2011:	172).	Johnston	aims	to	give	an	account	of	what	he	calls	
“attentive	 sensory	 episodes”	 (ASEs),	 such	 as	S’s	 looking	 at	 a	 red	 car.	
Such	an	episode	not	only	involves	S	being	related	to	an	object	of	per-
ception,	but	what	Johnston	calls	a	“manner	of	presentation”.	Accord-
ing	 to	 Johnston,	we	perceive	 the	objects	of	ASEs	under	manners	of	
presentation.	And	episodes	which	involve	the	same	object	can	differ	
thanks	 to	a	difference	 in	manner	of	presentation.	 Johnston	even	ex-
ploits	such	manners	of	presentation	in	discussing	illusions.	One	might	
think,	then,	that	our	view	is	a	variant	of	Johnston’s.
However,	 there	 is	 a	 critical	 difference.	 In	 line	with	 adverbialists,	
Beck,	and	the	Theory	of	Appearing,	Johnston	understands	manners	of	
presentation	in	terms	of	perceptible	features.	Furthermore,	to	provide	

























identities	 in	such	 things	as	 the	way	 in	which	 light	 is	 re-
flected	and	transmitted	from	the	objects	in	question,	and	











































matic	 circumstance	 for	 encountering	 orangeness.	On	 such	 a	 subjec-
tive	measure	of	similarity,	the	red	color	of	the	car	is	relevantly	similar	
19.	 For	ease	of	exposition,	we	focus	just	on	the	car’s	color,	but	in	general,	the	look	
of	an	object	which	 is	 relevantly	similar	 to	 the	paradigm	 look	of	an	orange	
object	may	involve	a	more	complex	construction	out	of	its	basic	visible	prop-
erties.	Pointillist	paintings	arguably	provide	a	good	example	of	such	a	case.







1.6 Don’t we risk introducing a common factor into explanations of phenom-
enology which conflicts with the core commitments of naïve realism?
We	have	explained	why	 the	 red	 car	 looks	orange	by	appealing	 to	a	
similarity	 in	how	 redness	perceived	one	way	 strikes	us	 and	orange-
ness	perceived	another	strikes	us.	We	accounted	for	this	similarity	by	
appealing	to	the	similarity	of	proximal	input	to	our	visual	system.	But	
if	how	things	strike	us	 is	explicable	 in	 terms	of	something	common	
across	such	cases,	then	there	would	seem	to	be	pressure	to	positively	
characterize	 the	phenomenological	 situation	common	to	both	cases.	

















































the	 subject	 perceives	 the	 scene	 affect	 the	 phenomenal	 character	 of	
their	experience	as	it	does?	Our	answer	here	will	advert	to	how	the	
various	elements	of	 the	scene	strike	the	subject,	given	the	way	they	
are	perceived	—	and	 in	particular,	 to	 the	visually	 relevant	 subjective	
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We	can	offer	a	parallel	defense	of	the	Difference	Principle:	Introspec-
tion	of	your	perceptual	experiences	 seems	 to	 reveal	only	aspects	of	
what	you	experience,	further	aspects	of	the	scenes,	as	presented.	Why?	
The	answer	is	that	your	perceptual	experiences	have	no	introspectible	
features	 over	 and	 above	 their	 character-constituting	 presented	 ele-





































6. Arguments for the Difference Principle
Rejecting	the	Difference	Principle	is	a	coherent	and	attractive	strategy	
for	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist.	However,	it	remains	to	consider	











reveal	 only	 aspects	 of	 what	 you	 experience,	 further	 as-
pects	of	the	scenes,	as	represented.	Why?	The	answer,	I	
suggest,	 is	 that	your	perceptual	experiences	have	no	 in-
trospectible	features	over	and	above	those	implicated	in	
their	intentional	contents.	So	the	phenomenal	character	

























Byrne’s	 “Premise	 B”	 has	 a	 natural	 naïve	 realist	 analogue:	 Simply	
replace	 “content”	 by	 “character-constituting	 presented	 elements”	 in	
the	final	sentence.	Analogously,	this	argument	simply	assumes	that	if	
there	is	a	difference	between	two	experiences	in	the	ways	things	seem	
to	 their	 subjects,	 there	must	 be	 a	 difference	 in	 presented	 elements.	























that	 there	are	differences	 in	phenomenal	character	which	do	not	 in-
volve	differences	in	the	presented	scene.23
Byrne	 (2001)	 offers	 a	 second	 well-known	 argument	 for	 pure	 in-
tentionalism.	Byrne’s	argument	distils	to	two	simple	claims:	first,	that	
there	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	phenomenal	character	of	someone’s	





can	convert	 this	argument	 into	an	argument	 for	 the	Difference	Prin-
ciple.	The	first	claim	remains	unaltered.	The	second	claim	becomes:	
There	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	way	the	world	seems	to	someone	in	
23.	Much	 ink	 has	 been	 spilt	 debating	 putative	 counter-examples	 to	 pure	 in-
tentionalism	 (e.g.	 Peacocke	 1983,	 Tye	 1995:	 155–159).	 Some	 intentionalist	








	 craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion
philosophers’	imprint	 –		16		– vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020)




between	 presentationalists	 and	 sensationalists.	 Presen-
tationalists	 think	 that	 phenomenal	 character	 is	 solely	
a	 matter	 of	 the	 subject’s	 awareness	 (or	 better, ostensible 
awareness)	of	his	environment.	…	According	 to	presen-
tationalists,	 th[e]	presented	 segment	of	 reality	fixes	 the	





If	 sensationalism	 is	 true,	 then	 the	 phenomenal	 char-
acter	of	an	experience	can	to	some	extent	float	free	from	



























Norm	as	 seeing	different	 aspects	of	 the	 color	 in	 the	 two	conditions	
(as	discussed	above,	and	in	conformity	with	the	Difference	Principle).	
Why?
[T]he	 phenomenal	 difference	 between	 Norm’s	 colour	
experience	 in	 the	 shop	and	 in	daylight	must	be	due	 to	
presentational	difference	if	it	is	to	have	the	positive	epis-
temic	 significance	 it	must	 have	 if	 on	 the	basis	 of	 these	
phenomenally	distinct	experiences	Norm	could	come	to	
know	which	colour	he	is	perceiving.	(2008:	956)	
What	 is	 obscure	 here	 is	 why	 only	 presentational	 differences	 could	
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